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Summary
This study describes a spatio­temporal 
cluster of Senecavirus A (SVA) outbreaks 
reported in a midwestern US slaughter plant 
during the summer of 2017. Data was col­
lected on multiple site characteristics to con­
duct risk factor analysis. On June 8, 2017, 
6 of 10 finishing pig lots delivered to the 
plant tested positive by reverse transcription­
polymerase chain reaction for SVA RNA. 
Subsequently, 88 lots presented vesicular le­
sions at the plant, and 74 lots tested positive 
between June 8 and July 10, 2017, which 
was a significant temporal cluster.
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Resumen - Una investigación retrospec-
tiva de los factores de riesgo asociados 
con embarques de cerdos positivos para el 
Senecavirus A en una planta empacadora 
del medio oeste de los EE UU durante el 
verano de 2017
Este estudio describe un grupo espacio­
temporal de brotes del Senecavirus A (SVA) 
notificados en una planta de sacrificio del 
medio oeste de los EE UU durante el verano 
de 2017. Se recopilaron datos sobre las carac­
terísticas de múltiples sitios para realizar un 
análisis de factores de riesgo. El 8 de junio de 
2017, 6 de cada 10 lotes de cerdos de engorda 
entregados a la planta dieron positivo por 
reacción en cadena de transcripción reversa de 
la polimerasa para el ARN del SVA. Posteri­
ormente, 88 lotes presentaron lesiones vesicu­
lares en la planta, y 74 lotes dieron positivo 
entre el 8 de junio y el 10 de julio de 2017, 
siendo un grupo temporal significativo.
Résumé - Enquête rétrospective sur les 
facteurs de risque associés avec des charge-
ments de porcs positifs pour le Senecavi-
rus A dans un abattoir du midwest Améri-
cain durant l’été 2017
La présente étude décrit un regroupement 
spatio­temporel de poussées de cas de 
Senecavirus A (SVA) rapportées dans un 
abattoir du midwest Américain durant l’été 
2017. Les données furent amassées sur les 
caractéristiques de sites multiples afin de 
mener une analyse des facteurs de risque. Le 
8 juin 2017, 6 des 10 lots de porcs amenés 
à l’abattoir testèrent positifs par réaction 
d’amplification en chaîne par la polymérase 
avec la transcriptase réverse pour l’ARN de 
SVA. Subséquemment, 88 lots amenés à 
l’abattoir ont présenté des lésions vésiculai­
res, et 74 lots ont testé positif entre le 8 juin 
et le 10 juillet 2017, ce qui représente un 
regroupement temporel significatif.
 
Senecavirus A (SVA) is a virus of the genus Senecavirus of the family Picornaviridae. The virus causes 
vesicular lesions around the snout, mouth, 
and hooves of pigs,1 and was first identified 
in North America in 2002 as a cell culture 
contaminant.2,3 In 2014 and 2015, SVA 
infection was also associated with outbreaks 
of neonatal pig mortality in Brazil and in the 
United States.4­7
Clinical signs associated with SVA include 
erosions, ulcerations, and vesicular lesions 
of the snout, oral mucosa, and coronary 
band of distal limbs. Clinically, SVA may 
be indistinguishable from foot­and­mouth 
disease (FMD) and other swine vesicular 
diseases. Since FMD is designated as a 
foreign animal disease (FAD) by the US 
Department of Agriculture (USDA), every 
clinical case with lesions characteristic of 
SVA or FMD, including cases recognized at 
packing plants, must be investigated to rule 
out the occurrence of an FAD. According to 
the USDA’s Veterinary Services Guidance 
Document 7406.3, an FAD investigation 
must be conducted by state or federal animal 
health officials.8 These investigations take 
time and resources from state and federal 
animal health officials and market personnel 
because pigs and products cannot move until 
tests confirm the absence of an FAD.
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Currently, there is limited data on the 
transmission and spread of SVA in the swine 
industry. This report describes an assessment 
of spatio­temporal dynamics, as well as an 
investigation of risk factors associated with 
a spike in the number of lots of pigs testing 
positive for Senecavirus A at a midwestern 
US packing plant during the summer of 
2017. The retrospective analysis conducted 
of all farms that provided animals to the 
packing plant during the investigation 
period (April 24, 2017 to August 8, 2017). 
The investigation, which was completed after 
the USDA ruled out FMD and confirmed 
SVA, aimed to describe epidemiological 
factors associated with the spike in the 
number of lots of pigs testing positive for 
Senecavirus A at a packing plant.
Case description
SVA investigation background
On June 8, 2017, 10 lots of finishing pigs 
were detected with vesicular lesions at a 
midwestern US packing plant. After the 
FAD Diagnostic Laboratory (FADDL) 
ruled out FMD, the lots were tested by 
reverse transcription­polymerase chain 
reaction (RT­PCR) for SVA RNA and 6 of 
the 10 lots were confirmed SVA positive. 
Between June 9, 2017 and July 10, 2017, 
74 lots presenting vesicular lesions at the 
same plant were confirmed SVA positive by 
RT­PCR. All cases were negative for FMD 
based on diagnostic testing at an FADDL. 
Following the confirmation of SVA­positive 
cases, an investigation was conducted to 
describe the cluster of cases and to identify 
factors that may have contributed to the 
spread of the virus. The investigation was 
conducted using data provided by the 
packing plant. The suppliers of pigs to the 
plant were not contacted nor were any of the 
sites from which pigs originated visited. 
Case definition
A lot of pigs was defined as all pigs from a 
single supplier in a truck load, consisting 
of up to approximately 170 market weight 
pigs. For the purpose of this study, the SVA 
status of each lot was used to classify the 
pig supplier (farm of origin). A case was 
defined as a pig supplier, which had a lot of 
pigs test positive for SVA RNA by RT­PCR 
after arriving at the packing plant. A single 
truck load with pigs from multiple suppliers 
would have multiple lots. During the 
investigation period, all lots that had clinical 
signs suggestive of vesicular disease were 
tested for SVA RNA by RT­PCR unless a 
previous test on pigs from the same supplier 
had already tested positive. 
Data
During the investigation period (April 24 to 
August 8, 2017) retrospective information 
on all suppliers that delivered pigs to the 
study packing plant were obtained from 
the plant records. The investigation period 
was broken into 3 periods based on the 
data obtained by the packing plant, the 
pre­outbreak period from April 24 to June 
7 (45 days), the outbreak period when SVA­
positive cases were reported from June 8 
to July 10 (32 days), and the post­outbreak 
period after the last positive case was reported 
from July 11 to August 8 (35 days). The 
supplier code, supplier address, and harvest 
date were provided for 237 suppliers that 
delivered lots of pigs to the packing plant 
during the investigation period. For each 
lot, the packing plant identified if the pigs 
were delivered to the packing plant through 
a buying station and whether the pigs for 
a single supplier originated from multiple 
sites. For suppliers with multiple sites, the 
exact number and address of all the sites 
was unknown. Therefore, the single address 
provided for the supplier by the packing plant 
was used to represent the multiple sites within 
the same geographic area. The harvest dates 
of the lots were collected to evaluate spatial­
temporal clusters of SVA­associated swine 
vesicular disease cases during the outbreak. 
The address of each pig supplier was provided 
by the packing plant and subjectively assessed 
using Google Earth maps to verify that it was 
a swine site and to assess if pigs were raised 
outdoors (absence of confinement buildings, 
presence of fences and walls forming outdoor 
pens, or presence of hoop structures) or 
indoors (presence of a confinement barn). 
This assessment was subjectively based on the 
type of animal housing facilities present in the 
satellite image. 
To describe weather conditions during 
the investigation period, mean daily 
measurements were compared against the 
mean from 30­year historical data on a 
weekly basis and described as a percentage 
of the mean historical value. The data for 
temperature, relative humidity, and rainfall 
precipitation were collected from a single 
weather station 25 kilometers north of the 
packing plant using Iowa Environmental 
Mesonet.9  The mean historical data for 
temperature and rainfall at the same 
weather station was extracted from Weather 
Underground10 and for humidity from 
Current Results.11
Data analysis
Descriptive analysis was performed on 
all data collected and odds ratios from 
univariate logistic regressions were 
computed to assess risk factors (P < .05). 
The univariate analyses were done using the 
R software (version 3.3.3; R Core Team) 
and the R Stats Package. The risk factors 
were: if the supplier raised pigs outdoors 
(Yes or No), if the pigs from the supplier 
were delivered to the packing plant through 
a buying station (Yes or No), and the 
supplier location type (multiple or single). 
Pigs from suppliers with a single location 
type all originated from a single site. Pigs 
from suppliers with a multiple location type 
originated from multiple sites within the 
same 1­mile geographic area. 
Retrospective local space­time clustering 
was evaluated using the Bernoulli model 
of the space­time scan statistic, which 
compares the number of observed cases 
occurring within all possible cylindrical 
windows with the expected number of 
cases falling in that window under the 
null hypothesis of random distribution of 
cases. The scan analysis was run assuming 
a maximum window size set for up to 
50% of the population at risk and with 
a temporal window of 1 day because the 
outbreak investigation period was short. The 
spatial­temporal analyses were performed 
using SaTScan software (Kulldorf and 
Information Management Services) and the 
spatialization of the sites were performed in 
QGIS software (QGIS Development Team). 
Eligibility criteria to include suppliers in 
the analyses were: 1) the address listed for 
the supplier could be located in Google 
Earth, 2) swine facilities were present at the 
location, and 3) the supplier had delivered 
one or more lots of pigs to the study packing 
plant during the investigation period.
Results and Discussion
Data was obtained from the packing plant 
for 237 suppliers who sent pigs to the plant 
during the investigation period (Figure 1). 
Data on lots of pigs from 44 of the suppliers 
were excluded from the analysis because 
the address listed for the supplier could not 
be located using Google Earth or because 
the location at the address appeared to lack 
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swine facilities. The remaining 193 suppliers 
sent 2378 lots of pigs to the packing 
plant during the investigation period. Of 
the 193 suppliers, 66 had at least 1 lot of 
pigs that was tested for SVA by RT­PCR 
because vesicular lesions were observed 
at the packing plant, and 61 had lots that 
were confirmed SVA positive by RT­PCR 
between June 8, 2017 and July 10, 2017. 
The onset of the outbreak and all the lots 
monitored during the investigation period 
are described in Figure 1. The timing of SVA 
cases was consistent with a seasonal peak in 
cases during the summer months.12
Of the 193 suppliers, 38 raised pigs 
outdoors, 22 sent pigs through a buying 
station, and 60 sent pigs from multiple sites 
(Table 1). One of the risk factors evaluated 
was the frequency of SVA­positive pigs from 
lots going through buying stations compared 
to those coming directly to the plant from 
the site where the pigs were raised. However, 
there was no difference in the odds of testing 
positive for SVA by RT­PCR between lots of 
pigs delivered through a buying station and 
those directly shipped from the site where 
they were raised. The odds of a supplier 
that raised pigs outdoors having a lot that 
tested positive for SVA was 0.34 (95% CI, 
0.12­0.81, P = .01), or 66% less compared to 
suppliers that raised pigs indoors. The odds 
of suppliers with single type sites having a lot 
that tested SVA positive was 0.58 (95% CI, 
0.34­1.1, P = .09), or 42% less compared to 
suppliers with multiple type sites.
Combined, those 2 ‘protective’ risk factors 
(outdoor pigs and originating from single 
sites) may be explained by these suppliers 
likely being smaller, not part of a larger 
production system, and having less contact 
with other sites (eg, shared equipment or 
trucks). Fewer connections may serve as 
a protective factor since the frequency of 
events in a swine farm (eg, frequency of 
feed delivery and rendering dead pigs) has 
been shown to be a significant risk factor for 
disease transmission and spread.13,14
The relative humidity in weeks 1 to 6 was 
above the mean historical values. In weeks 2, 
3, and 6, daily high temperatures were above 
historical mean values and greater than 
mean historical  rainfall events occurred in 
weeks 1 and 4 (Table 2). While it is unclear 
why cases of SVA tend to increase in summer 
months, one possible hypothesis is that SVA 
is transmitted from one herd to another 
by flying insects. However, vectors are of 
negligible importance in the epidemiology 
of the disease.
Joshi et al15 conducted a diagnostic 
investigation in 2 SVA­affected herds 
and detected SVA in environmental 
samples, mice, and houseflies. The results 
of this investigation do not challenge that 
hypothesis since the warm and humid 
weather conditions before and during the 
cluster of SVA cases at the packing plant 
were favorable for flying insects to live and 
reproduce.16 Humidity and temperatures 
remained at or above the 30­year mean 
during the outbreak and another rainfall 
event led to above normal rainfall in week 8. 
Although descriptive, our findings support 
that weather conditions were favorable for 
the reproduction of flying insects, which 
may have contributed to the spread of SVA 
between sites. However, the finding that pigs 
raised outdoors was a protective risk factor 
may contradict that hypothesis since pigs 
raised outdoors are generally more accessible 
to flying insects. 
Figure 1: Lots of finishing pigs monitored for SVA at a midwestern US packing plant from April 24 to August 8, 2017. Lots 
tested positive for SVA by RT-PCR (n = 74; red bars), tested negative for SVA by RT-PCR (n = 14; green bars), or not tested  
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Table 1: Risk factors associated with lots testing positive for SVA by RT-PCR at a midwestern US pork plant between April 24 to 
August 8, 2017
Lots tested for SVA by RT-PCR
Negative or not 
tested, No.*
Negative or 
not tested, % Positive, No. Positive, % OR (95% CI)† P‡
Pigs raised outdoors
         Yes (n = 38) 32 84.2 6 15.8 0.34 (0.12-0.81) .01
         No (n = 155) 100 64.5 55 35.5
Buying station
         Yes (n = 22) 17 77.3 5 22.7 0.60 (0.19-1.61) .34
         No (n = 171) 115 67.3 56 32.7
Supplier location type  
         Single site (n = 133) 96 72.2 37 27.8 0.58 (0.34-1.10) .09
         Multiple sites (n = 60) 36 60.0 24 40.0
* Only lots of pigs showing clinical signs of vesicular disease were tested.
† Odds ratio of a lot testing positive for SVA by RT-PCR if the supplier had (yes) the factor evaluated.
‡ Presence of lots testing positive (yes or no) were compared using logistic regression with a model that included the risk factor (pigs raised 
outdoors, buying station and supplier location type) as the main effect.
SVA = Senecavirus A; RT-PCR = reverse transcription-polymerase chain reaction; OR = odds ratio. 







Humidity high, % Temperature high, °C Rainfall precipitation, mm
2017
% of historical 
mean† 2017
% of historical 
mean† 2017
% of historical 
mean†
1 4/24–4/30 0 86.6 111 10.0 76 8.3 327
2 5/1–5/7 0 84.4 106 21.7 103 1.2 42
3 5/8–5/14 0 82.6 104 25.0 109 2.1 69
4 5/15-5/21 0 93.0 117 17.9 88 12.3 367
5 5/22-5/28 0 86.0 108 21.7 95 0.1 3
6 5/29-6/4 0 88.7 110 27.9 106 0.0 0
7 6/5-6/11 17 75.3 93 31.5 111 0.0 0
8 6/12-6/18 27 88.3 109 30.3 106 5.7 161
9 6/19-6/25 25 79.4 98 28.3 99 0.0 0
10 6/26-7/2 5 87.9 108 28.5 97 3.3 99
11 7/3-7/9 0 86.9 105 32.1 104 0.0 0
12 7/10-7/16 1 91.6 111 31.9 103 3.1 113
13 7/17-7/23 0 90.1 109 33.5 106 0.1 3
14 7/24-7/30 0 91.6 111 29.8 100 4.5 171
15 7/31-8/6 0 92.6 109 25.1 90 3.3 121
16 8/7-8/9 0 98.5 116 25.8 92 0.0 0
*  The investigation period occurred from April 24 to August 8, 2017 and consisted of 3 periods: pre-outbreak (week 1-6); outbreak when 
Senecavirus A-positive cases were reported (week 7-12); and post outbreak after the last positive case was reported (week 13-16).
†  Values in bold are above the 30-year mean for that week. 
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Figure 2: Cluster map showing the location of suppliers during an SVA outbreak between June 8 and June 28, 2017. Red dots 
represent supplier addresses that had at least one lot of pigs that tested positive for SVA by RT-PCR at the packing plant, blue 
triangles represent supplier addresses with lots of pigs that tested negative for SVA by RT-PCR at the plant, and the purple dot 
is the packing plant. The yellow circle is the geographic cluster containing 81 supplier locations, 32 of which had at least one 
SVA-positive lot of pigs delivered to the packing plant. SVA = Senecavirus A; RT-PCR = reverse transcription-polymerase chain 
reaction.
 
One significant cluster in time and space 
(P < .001; Figure 2) was detected with the 
spatial­temporal analyses. The time frame 
of the cluster was from June 8 to 28, which 
was nearly the entire outbreak period, and 
the cluster covered a region with a radius of 
83 km. The packing plant was located about 
23 km south of the cluster center (Figure 2). 
Thirty­two of the 81 sites (39.5%) in this 
cluster had at least one lot of pigs that 
tested positive for SVA by RT­PCR. The 
cluster results confirmed that the number 
of observed cases in this cluster were over 3 
times higher than the number of expected 
cases, suggesting that the proximity to 
the packing plant may be associated with 
a higher than expected incidence of lots 
testing positive for SVA. Thus, the presence 
of the packing plant inside the cluster 
highlight that it may serve as an indirect 
contact between the sites since packing 
plants can act as a potential reservoir 
of bacterial, viral, prion, and parasitic 
pathogens capable of infecting animals and 
fomites.17,18
However, a comprehensive investigation 
of all possible routes of transmission of the 
virus was not conducted. Therefore, the 
role the packing plant played in the spread 
of the virus can only be speculated. There 
were other limitations in this outbreak 
investigation as well. Due to the large 
number of suppliers involved (n = 193), 
suppliers were not contacted and site visits 
were not carried out. Only information 
provided by the packing plant was used. To 
validate the geographic location of suppliers 
provided by the plant, Google Earth images 
were used to verify the supplier address and 
subjectively assess the presence and type 
(indoor or outdoor) of swine facilities. 
Although the most recent images were used, 
the possibility of outdated images or errors 
in characterizing the facilities may have led 
to some classification bias.
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Implications
Under the conditions of this study:
• A cluster of SVA cases occurred at a 
plant between June 8 and June 28, 2017.
• Pigs with SVA were less likely from 
single site suppliers or kept outdoors.
• Weather conditions pre­outbreak may 
have favored insect multiplication. 
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